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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we develop and estimate a model to explain the level and source country 
composition of immigration to the United States since the early 1970s. The model incorporates 
ratios to the US of source country income and education, and demographic structure, as well as 
relative inequality as suggested by the Roy model applied to migrant selection. In addition we 
incorporate the ‘friends and relatives effect’ as reflected in the stock of previous immigrants and a 
variety of variables representing different dimensions of the immigration quotas set by policy. We 
estimate our immigration model on a panel of 81 source countries for the years 1971 to 1998. The 
results strongly support the influence of economic and demographic variables and geographic 
characteristics as well as policy variables. We use the results to shed light on the factors that 
influenced the composition of US immigration by source region. And we provide a further check 
on its plausibility by simulating the effects of the key changes in immigration policy since the 
late1970s.  
 






  Since 1950 more that 25 million immigrants have been admitted to the United States, 
about 20 million of whom arrived after 1970. This mass influx has stimulated a lively debate 
about the gains from immigration and the implications for immigration policy. Much of the 
literature has concentrated on the economic outcomes for the immigrants themselves and on 
the labor market impacts on native-born labor. These effects typically depend on how US 
immigrants are selected -- both within and between counties of origin -- and models of this 
process are at the heart of the analysis. But while the literature is long on examining the 
outcomes of immigration, it is surprisingly short on estimating the determinants of 
immigration and on testing the models of immigrant selection which underpin our 
understanding of those outcomes. Our goal here is to develop and test just such a model.  
This paper offers new estimates of the determinants of immigration rates by source 
from 1971 to 1998. It isolates the economic and demographic fundamentals that determine 
immigration rates across source countries and over time. These are real incomes, education, 
demographic composition, and inequality. We also allow for persistence in the flows arising 
from the stock of previous immigrants from the same source -- accounting for the widely 
acknowledged but rarely estimated ‘friends and relatives’ effect. While existing studies 
typically include some of these variables, they often omit one or more of the key influences 
suggested by migration theory. More important is their neglect of immigration policy. Here 
we include policy variables that are derived directly from the quotas allocated to different 
visa categories. Finally, we examine more countries over a longer period than does existing 
work on late 20th century US immigration.  
We start in the next section by providing some background to US immigration and 
immigration policy. We then set out a theoretical framework that is used to guide the choice 
of variables for regression analysis and to interpret the results. After presenting our 
econometric results we evaluate the effects of economic and demographic variables on the 
composition of immigration by source region and the effects of major shifts in immigration 
policy on the total numbers.  
 
Immigration and Immigration Policy 
Changes in US immigration over the last 50 years are well known. As Table 1 
shows, the overall number legally admitted rose from quarter of a million per year in 
the 1950s to nearly half a million in the 1970s and close to a million in the 1990s. The 
change in source composition has been even more dramatic. Europeans formed over  
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half of the total in the 1950s, and the bulk of these were from Western Europe; by the 
1990s, Western Europeans were a mere 5 percent of the total. The counterpart to this 
is the sharp rise in the proportion coming from Asia; the other notable feature being 
the ongoing rise in the share from Mexico. The sharpest change in the composition 
occurred between the 1950s and the 1970s and was associated with a major policy 
shift in 1965. Since then the composition of the flows has been more stable although 
Western Europe has continued to decline and Mexico has continued to increase.  
The most radical shift in postwar immigration policy was the 1965 Amendments to 
the Immigration and Nationality Act. Before this date country of origin quotas allocated the 
bulk of the visas to European countries and two thirds of these went to Germany and the UK. 
The 1965 legislation (effective 1968) abolished the quotas so that immigrants from all 
countries could compete more equally for the available visas.  It established a maximum 
quota of 20,000 for each Eastern Hemisphere country, subject to an overall ceiling of 
170,000. Within the quota, visas were allocated according to a seven-category preference 
system, which gave 64 percent of visas to relatives of US citizens or residents, 6 percent to 
refugees, and 30 percent to employment-based categories. Children and spouses of US 
citizens were exempt from the quota, underpinning the strong emphasis on family 
reunification. In addition, a ceiling of 120,000 visas was set for the Western Hemisphere, but 
without country quotas or a preference system.
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Immigration legislation was amended again by an Act of 1976 (effective 1977) when 
quotas of 20,000 per country, together with the system of preferences, was extended to 
Western Hemisphere countries, and an Act of 1978 (effective 1979) when the hemispheric 
ceilings were combined into an overall quota of 290,000. In 1980 the preference category for 
refugees was removed and the worldwide ceiling was reduced to 270,000 (effective 1981). In 
1986 the Immigration Reform and Control Act provided for the legalization of illegal 
immigrants who had resided in the US since before 1982. It also expanded the H-2 program 
for temporary foreign workers and introduced temporary visas for agricultural workers with 
three years residence in the United States.  
The most important amendment to the post-1965 regulations came in the 1990 
Immigration Act (effective 1992). This legislation introduced an overall quota of 675,000, 
divided into three classes. First, a total of 480,000 visas was allocated to family immigrants, 
with immediate relatives of US citizens coming under the quota for the first time. Within this 
total, a minimum of 226,000, allocated according to a four-part preference system, were  
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given to family-sponsored non-immediate relatives of US citizens and resident aliens.
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Second, the 1990 Act increased the number of employment based visas to 140,000 (from 
60,000 previously), under a five-part preference system.
3 Third, 55,000 visas were allocated 
on top of the overall quota for "diversity" immigrants -- those from countries with relatively 
low immigration since 1965.
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The current (and past) legislation provides different routes into the United States. 
Differences among source regions in levels of economic development and immigration 
histories are reflected in the composition of entry routes. Table 2 illustrates these differences 
for 1998. Overall, just 12 percent entered on employment based preference categories, but 
the figures are substantially higher for immigrants from Western Europe and Canada. 
Employment-based entry is particularly low for Eastern Europe and Africa, where refugee 
and asylee admissions are significant, and also from Mexico and the Caribbean. It is notable 
also that reunion with immediate family is the entry route for more than half of Western 
Hemisphere immigrants except for Canada. The data suggest that the persistence effects of 
past immigration has waned for Western Europe and Canada, as reflected in the small share 
of family-sponsored preferences (a fact partly represented in the diversity category). It is also 
small for Africa, a source country for whom American mass immigration has only just begun. 
It is very large for the remaining regions in transition: 34 percent for Asia (74 percent when 
“immediate relatives” are included) and the Americas (86 percent when “immediate 
relatives” are included), reaching an enormous 42 percent for Mexico (88 percent when 
“immediate relatives” are included). 
There are two important indirect routes that have affected the sources of 
immigration. One is illegal immigration, which has increased over time and is currently 
running at about 300,000 per year. Mass legalization of 2.7 million illegal immigrants took 
place in the decade after the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. These provided 
an additional route to legal immigration largely for Western Hemisphere immigrants, and 
particularly from Mexico. The other source is by those entering as temporary workers and 
trainees with H, O and P visas, the numbers of which soared from 75,000 in 1985 to 430,000 
in 1998. This rising source originated chiefly from Europe and Asia. These are not part of the 
                                                                                                                                             
1 Further details of numbers allocated to different preference categories are given in Appendix 2D.  
2 The maximum number of visas allocated to non-immediate family members is the difference between 
480,000 and the actual number of visas issued to immediate relatives in the previous year, subject to a 
minimum of 226,000. Thus under the 'flexible cap' system the total number admitted under the quota 
can exceed the overall cap in a particular year.  
3 The quotas for different preferences in the employment-based category are detailed in Appendix 2D.  
4 In the transitional period between 1992 and 1994, the overall quota was raised to 700,000 with  
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overall immigration total, but temporary visas clearly have been used as an intermediate step 
before adjusting to permanent status.  
 
Modeling Immigration  
Immigration is determined partly by individual incentives and constraints, and partly 
by policy. Immigration policy can be seen as a filter though which ex ante migration 
decisions are translated into ex post migration. The economics of the migration decision has 
been widely studied, most notably by Larry Sjaastad (1962), George Borjas (1987) and Barry 
Chiswick (2000). Here we set out a heuristic framework that follows in this tradition. It 
emphasizes the roles of income differentials, skill differentials, migration costs, demographic 
at-risk sensitivity, and immigration policy on the probability that individuals will move from 
one country to another.  
Individual i (i = 1,....,n) residing in source country y receives the wage wy(si), where 
si is the individual's skill level. The wage the individual would receive in the destination 
country x is wx(si). Thus the gains to migration for individual i are represented by the 
difference wx(si) − wy(si).  Migration costs depend on four elements. First there is an 
individual-specific migration cost, zi. This may be interpreted as reflecting individual 
preferences for migration in terms of equivalent income. This compensating differential 
differs across individuals, but would be expected to be positive on average. Factors such as 
having relatives in the destination country are likely to lower the psychic cost component of 
zi. It will also reflect the lower direct cost of immigration through family reunion or family-
sponsored preference categories as compared with other routes, including illegal migration.  
Second there is a direct cost, c1, which is the same for all migrants from source 
country y, but which may differ across source countries according to distance from the 
destination. It may also reflect immigration policy: tougher immigration policy raises the cost 
of migration for all immigrants by raising c1. Third, there is the cost to migrants associated 
with quantitative restrictions: The greater is the total quota, the lower is the cost in terms of 
waiting time, or the cost and effort of moving to a higher preference category. Thus the cost-
equivalent effect of quotas is represented by c2(q), which applies to all potential migrants, 
given their status under the quota. Finally, skill-selective immigration policy is represented 
by a term γ(δ − si); the higher the individual's skill-level, relative to benchmark level δ, the 
lower are the costs of migration. A rise in δ increases the overall standard for admission, 
while an increase in the skill-selectivity of immigration policy, for a given threshold, is 
                                                                                                                                             
465,000 visas reserved for close family immigration, but the diversity program was limited to 40,000.  
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represented by an increase in the parameter γ.  
  Putting these elements together, the probability that individual i will migrate from 
country y to country x is: 
mi = Prob(vi > 0), where vi = wx(si) − wy(si) − zi − c1 + c2(q) − γ(δ − si)         (1) 
Across individuals in country y, wx(si), wy(si), zi, and si are assumed to be normally 
distributed with means µx, µy, µz, and µs respectively. Summing over all n individuals in the 






 − + − + + + −
− =
v
s 2 1 z y x
σ
) μ δ ( γ ) q ( c c μ μ μ
Φ 1 M        (2) 
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function and σv is the standard deviation of the 
net benefit function v. This is simply a modified version of the Roy model advanced by 
Borjas (1987) among others.  
Higher mean wage rates in the destination country or lower mean wage rates in the 
source country (for a given skill level) increase the migration rate, as does a fall in the mean 
of personal migration costs, µz, or a fall in the fixed migration cost, c1. An increase in the 
average skill-level in country y would increase the migration rate if there is skill selective 
immigration policy in country x (γ > 0), and could increase the migration rate through the 
wage differential, if the function wx is steeper than wy. The variances will also matter and the 
effect of changing wage and skill distributions will depend on their effect on σv, and the sign 
of the mean of −vi, that is – [µx − µy − µz − c1 + c2(q) − γ(δ−µs)]. These effects are examined 
further in Appendix 1. To take one example, if the mean of vi is positive (the destination is 
relatively rich) then the migration rate will be an inverse ‘u’ shaped function of the ratio of 
source to destination wage inequality (as an inverse proxy for the return on skills). 
Immigration policy will also influence the volume of migration through several  
different channels represented by the terms in equation (2). Widening of family reunification 
policies, by reducing zi for some potential emigrants, will lower its mean µz, and increase 
migration. A reduction in the overall quota, q, would raise direct migration costs through 
c2(q) and therefore reduce migration. An increase in skill selectivity through raising the 
threshold value, δ, would be expected to reduce the migration rate while the effect of 
increasing the value of γ could raise or lower the migration rate (see Appendix 1).  
Since migration is a forward-looking decision, it is useful to think of the gains to 
migration in present value terms. Thus wx(si) and wy(si) can be thought of as discounted 
income streams for individual i in the destination and source respectively. For any individual  
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the present value of migration as represented by the difference between these income 
streams, net of costs, will depend on the length of working life remaining. Hence the net gain 
represented by equation (2) will be greater the younger is the potential migrant in the source 
country. It follows that the source country age structure should also matter: the larger the 




Recent studies of US immigration highlight some of the economic forces that 
determine immigration rates across source countries. The dependent variable is typically 
taken as the number of immigrants to the US relative to the source country population, 
representing the propensity to emigrate to the United States. Borjas (1987) found that, for a 
cross section of average emigration rates 1951-80, migration was negatively related to origin 
country income per capita and to distance from the United States. In addition, the emigration 
rate was negatively related to inequality in the origin country, implying negative within-
country selection.
6 Using a cross-section of source country immigration rates for 1982-6 
Philip Yang (1995) confirmed the income effects but found the stock of previous immigrants 
from each source country to be the single most important determinant of the immigration 
flow.  
More recently David Karemera, Victor Oguledo and Bobby Davis (2000) used panel 
data on emigration rates for the decade 1976-1986, including a wide range of explanatory 
variables for both the United States and countries of origin. They found that emigration rates 
were related negatively to distance from the United States, negatively to origin country 
income, positively to US income, and negatively to the US unemployment rate. In addition 
they found that migration was positively related to measures of political rights and individual 
freedom in source countries, and negatively to political instability. Thus, their results confirm 
the importance of economic variables, migration costs and civil rights in determining 
migration. Immigration policy in the US was modeled as a dummy variable only.  
  In order to study the effects of policy change, Guillerma Jasso, Mark Rosenzweig 
and James Smith (2000) modeled male immigrants admitted as husbands of US citizens over 
the period 1972-90. They argued that this category, which was not subject to the quota, was 
                                                 
5 Let the wage difference (destination minus source country) per year of working life be a constant D. If 
the age range of potential working-age migrants, a, runs from 20 to 65, and the discount rate is r, then 




a () ( )
() =− +
−− 11
46 , which is a decreasing function of 
a.  
6 This is consistent with the Roy model summarized in equation (1) above where source countries are  
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nevertheless influenced by immigration policy, both directly, due to tightening eligibility 
conditions, and indirectly, due to substitution across entry categories in response to changes 
in the conditions for entering through other routes. In addition to income and education, 
policy dummies were found to matter. In particular, application of the preference system to 
the Western Hemisphere raised the numbers arriving as male spouses from that region, while 
the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 reduced the numbers.  
Previous studies have contributed much, but they suffer a number of shortcomings. 
First, they either use country cross-sections, or cover a limited number of years in time series, 
or only explore a subset of all immigration. We think there is an advantage to being more 
comprehensive: by covering emigration regions in decline, ascension, and transition we are 
more likely to identify the economic and demographic fundamentals driving changing 
immigrant source. Second, a number of key variables stressed by theory are often omitted. 
Among these are the age structure of sending population and measures of human capital 
and/or the return to skills. The omission of variables that are central to migration theory make 
it impossible to assess the role of sending country demographic and human capital attributes. 
Third, despite the obvious importance of "chain migration" effects which have been greatly 
reinforced by family reunification policies, proxies for these effects -- like the resident 
immigrant stock -- are often omitted from the analysis. Finally, shifts in immigration policy 
are typically reflected by dummies rather than by variables that take full account of changes 
in the size and structure of quotas, and to whom they apply.  
  We attempt to capture the determinants of the emigration rate to the United States by 
the following specification: 
 
(mig/pop)j,t  =  β0 + β1 (yj/yus)t + β2 (syrj/syrus)t + β3agej,t  + β4 (ineqj/inequs),t  
                   + β5 (ineqj/inequs)
2
,t + β6 distj  + β7 landj + β8 engj + β9 (stockj,t-1/popj,t)  
                   + β10 (stockj,t-1/popj,t)
2 + β11 Xr,j.t (stockj t-1/popjt)  + β12 Xe,j,t (syrj/syrus)t + β13 Xd,j,t  
                   + β14 Xa,j,t  civj,t + β15 Xirc,j,t + β16 Xb       (3) 
 
The left-hand side variable is migration to the US from country j in year t as proportion of the 
origin country population.  
              Economic and demographic fundamentals are reflected by the first five terms while 
the others represent costs. The first term, the ratio of the average (purchasing power parity 
adjusted) income in j relative to the United States is expected to have a negative effect; β1 < 
                                                                                                                                             
relatively poor and relatively unequal compared with the United States (see Appendix 1).  
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0. The second term is the ratio of average years of schooling (syr) in j relative to the US. 
Since the income variable reflects both the amount of human capital and the average return 
on human capital it must be ‘deflated’ by human capital stocks in order to reflect the relative 
return alone. Thus, relative schooling years is expected to have a positive effect on 
immigration; β2 > 0. The variable “age” in the origin country is the share of population aged 
15-29. It reflects the fact that the present value of migration is higher, for a given wage 
incentive, at younger ages: thus, β3 > 0. The ratio of inequality in the origin relative to the US 
(ineq) is entered in quadratic form. According to the Roy model, when the destination 
country is richer than the source (adjusted for migration costs) the effects of inequality 
follow an inverse ‘u’ shape. When the origin country is relatively unequal, an increase in its 
relative inequality will reduce the migration rate; when the source country is relatively equal 
an increase in its inequality will increase the migration rate (see Appendix 1). Hence β4 > 0, 
β5 < 0. Here inequality is represented by the gini coefficient of household income.  
          Migration costs constrain the move. As in any gravity model, these costs rise with 
distance from the US; hence, β6 < 0. Such costs are also associated with whether the source 
country is landlocked and whether it is predominantly English-speaking; β7 < 0, β8 > 0. 
Current migration costs are also represented by the stock of previous immigrants from the 
sending country. This is defined as the ratio of the number born in country j residing in the 
US at time t-1 relative to the population of country j. Relatives (and friends) abroad reduce 
migration costs, β9 > 0. We expect this effect to diminish with size (over the relevant range, 
hence β10 < 0) if it is being driven by immigrant job search and settlement costs (diminishing 
returns to network externalities). We would not expect the effect to diminish with size if 
instead the forces reflected remittances releasing the financial constraint. 
             The remaining variables represent the effects of immigration policies, through the 
different routes of entry. These are interacted with other variables to represent the ease of 
access to these channels for migrants from a given country. The variables Xr, Xe, Xd, and Xa 
represent the number of visas available by different entry routes, divided by the total 
population of the countries that qualify for them. These are derived separately for each major 
channel of entry, and are calculated for each country, as described in Appendix 2(D). This 
reflects the scarcity of visas and hence the cost of immigration. A fall in X as a result of a 
reduction in the quota will therefore reduce migration; thus β11 through β14 are expected to be 
positive. 
          The variable Xr represents the quota for non-immediate relatives and it is interacted 
with the immigrant stock divided by origin country population. Thus, the higher the stock of  
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foreign born from a given country, the lower the average cost of migration from that country 
and the more migrants choosing that route. Xe represents the quota of employment visas and 
is interacted with the ratio of schooling years to capture the element of skill selectivity. Xd 
reflects the quota of diversity visas available since 1992, prior to which it takes the value of 
zero. Since diversity visas are awarded by lottery, it is not interacted with country 
characteristics. Xa represents the allocation of visas to refugees which since 1980 has been 
set year by year rather than coming under the legislated quota. This variable is interacted 
with a dummy for civil war -- the main cause of refugee flights (e.g. Hatton and Williamson 
2001).  
          The final two variables represent somewhat special circumstances. Xirc is intended to 
capture the effects of the IRCA legalization program. It is the estimated number of illegal 
immigrants from a given country residing in the United States preceding the legalization 
program divided by that country's population. It is applied only to the years 1989-91, when 
the bulk of legalizations took place, and β15 is therefore expected to be positive. Finally, Xb is 
a dummy for the years 1995-8 when, due to administrative changes in the processing of visa 
applications, there was a progressive rise in the backlog. As a result, recorded immigration 
for these years was lower than it would otherwise have been, and the dummy is therefore 
expected to be negative; β16 < 0. Details of the derivation of these variables are given in 
Appendix 2D.  
 
Econometric Results 
  We estimate our migration model on panel data for immigration to the United States 
by place of birth for 81 source countries across the 28 years from 1971 to 1990 (see 
Appendix 2A and E). These countries form 82.5 percent of all US immigration over this 
entire period. For relative income we use purchasing power parity adjusted GDP per head 
from the Penn World Tables; years of education is based on the series derived by Barro and 
Lee. Total population and population aged 15-29 come from the UN demographic database; 
the gini coefficient for household income (a crude measure for the return to skills) is 
calculated from data collected by the World Bank and the WIDER Institute. These sources 
are further detailed in Appendix 2C. The stock of foreign born from each source country is 
calculated using census and CPS data and then interpolating using gross immigration flows in 
order to obtain annual series. The sources and methods of calculation are discussed in 
Appendix 2B.  
  Our estimating equation is based on equation (3) but, because the gross immigration 
rate is bounded at zero, the left hand side variable is transformed by taking natural logs. The  
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right hand side variables are as in equation (3). We also include fixed effects for nine 
geographical regions (not reported in Table 3). These are assumed to capture, among other 
things, the availability of alternative migrant destinations, since third country effects are not 
included in the model. We also include separate dummies for the border states, Canada and 
Mexico.  
  The results from estimating the equation on this pooled cross section/time series 
dataset appear in Table 3. The first column excludes the immigrant stock variable and all the 
policy related variables. All the explanatory variables are significant with the expected signs 
and they account for nearly three quarters of the variation in the dependent variable. When, 
in the second column, the (lagged) immigrant stock is added the coefficients of the other 
variables are somewhat attenuated, but the overall pattern remains the same. The attenuation 
has an obvious explanation: the lagged immigrant stock variable has embedded in it the 
influence of previous economic and demographic fundamentals that are correlated with 
present fundamentals. The full model in the third column includes the policy variables; 
adding these has little effect on the coefficients of the economic and demographic 
fundamentals. All these variables take the expected signs although those representing 
diverity, refugees and the processing backlog have low levels of significance. Other variables 
suggested by the literature, such as an index of source country civil rights, and the US 
unemployment rate, failed to provide significant coefficients and thus were excluded 
throughout.  
  It is worth examining the quantitative implications of some of these estimated 
coefficients, focusing on the third column. The relative income term implies that a 10 percent 
increase in a country’s income per capita reduces the immigration rate by around 5 percent. A 
more dramatic implication of the coefficient on relative income is this: moving from an 
income level typical of Western Europe to one typical of South America raises the 
immigration rate by about 70 percent. A 10 percent increase in a country’s years of schooling 
(equivalent to 0.55 years for the average source country) increases the immigration rate by 13 
percent. Again, a more dramatic implication of the coefficient on relative schooling is this: 
moving from an education level typical of Western Europe to one typical of South America 
reduces the immigration rate by about 50 percent. Relative schooling is also interacted with 
the variable Xe, and the positive coefficient supports the interpretation that this element of 
immigration policy is (mildly) skill-selective. Through this channel, increasing a country’s 
relative schooling level by 10 percent raises its immigration rate by a further one percentage 
point.  
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  Raising a source country’s share aged 15-29 by ten per thousand of population 
increases immigration rate by 3.7 percent or by 2.6 per thousand. Thus, demographic effects 
have a significant direct influence by changing the number of potential immigrants, although 
their impact would be bigger if we added the effect of demography on the sending country’s 
per capita income. The influence of relative inequality is more complex because the variable 
enters non-linearly. The quadratic peaks at a ratio of the foreign/US gini coefficient of 1.3, 
consistent with the prediction of the Roy model (a peak greater than one) in the presence of 
selective immigration policy (see Appendix 1). Thus, moving from a relative inequality ratio 
typical of South America (1.20, higher inequality than the US) to one typical of Western 
Europe (0.82, lower inequality than the US) reduces the immigration rate by 25 percent, a 
very sizeable effect. This is because, even if mean incomes were the same in both regions, 
South Americans would have an incentive to migrate across a wide range of skill levels 
whereas, for Europeans, that incentive would be concentrated only among those at the higher 
skill levels. 
  The coefficient on the migrant stock by itself (i.e. ignoring its interaction with Xr) is 
of particular interest because it reflects the non-policy component of the ‘friends and 
relatives effect.’ While the linear term is positive as expected, the squared term is strongly 
negative implying that the marginal effect is large when the stock is small but diminishes as 
the stock increases. That marginal effect eventually falls to zero when the migrant stock in 
the US reaches 11.6 percent of the source country population. At the mean (1.3 percent of 
source country population), the coefficients imply that if the immigrant stock from a given 
source is raised by 1000, the annual flow from that source would be increased by 27.7 
immigrants. This direct effect is augmented by an indirect effect working through the policy 
variable representing the quota on non-immediate relatives (Xr). This adds a further 2.2 
immigrants, yielding 29.9 more immigrants per year for every 1000 added to the existing 
immigrant stock. Thus, the overall ‘friends and relatives effect’ is powerful. It is equivalent 
to compounding the immigrant stock by 3 percent per year and it is more than enough to 
compensate for the ‘depreciation’ of the immigrant stock through deaths and return migration 
(about 1 percent on average).  
  The effects of immigration policy are discernible although not as strong as source 
country economic, demographic and geographical characteristics. An increase of 10 percent 
in the quota for family members raises immigration from a country by 0.4 percent; the same 
proportionate increase in employment visas raises it by 1 percent. Proportionate changes in 
the diversity quota and in the refugee allowances have relatively small effects since these are 
small components of the overall immigration program. By contrast, the effects of the  
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Immigration Reform and Control Act were relatively large and these are discussed further 
below.  
The Regional Composition of US Immigration  
          The source-country composition of US immigration changed dramatically from the 
1960s and this has been widely ascribed to the effects of the 1965 Amendments to the 
Immigration Act. Abolishing the quotas favoring European countries widened the 
opportunities for immigrants from a wider range of countries to compete on a more or less 
equal basis for the available visas. So what influence did source country variables have on 
the regional composition of immigration that emerged under the post-1965 regime?  
  To get a feel for these magnitudes we pose the question: what would the regional 
composition of immigration look like if a given variable took the same value for all source 
countries? To do this we first set each country’s value of a given variable to the mean across 
all source countries for that year. We then use equation (3) in Table 3 to predict a 
counterfactual immigration level for each country/year in the dataset. Setting each variable in 
turn to the annual mean ensures that total predicted immigration remains approximately 
constant--keeping the counterfactual in line with the overall immigration policy constraint. 
Predictions for the total immigration by region are adjusted to allow for different degrees of 
under-representation of the regional totals by the countries in our dataset.  
  Table 4 shows the differences, in percentage points, between the counterfactual 
composition of total immigration between 1971 and 1998 and the actual. The actual shares 
are given in the top line. Thus for the per capita income counterfactual, the first entry in line 
(1) indicates that, had the per capita incomes of Western European countries been the same 
as the mean for all sending countries, then this lower income level would have increased 
Western Europe’s share of total immigration by 5.2 percentage points, from 7.3 percent to 
12.5 percent. It would also raise the shares of Canada and Mexico while reducing those of 
other regions, especially East Asia. On the whole, the effects of education work in the 
opposite direction but not for Eastern Europe and East Asia, both of which have low income 
relative to their education levels. Line (3) shows that the combined effect of income and 
education boosted immigration from these regions compared with all others while the 
opposite is true for Mexico and the Caribbean.  
  The effects of inequality are smaller than income and education; levels of inequality 
below the mean tended to suppress immigration from Europe and Asia relative to Mexico, the 
Caribbean, Central and South America. Similarly, the effects of demographic structure have 
relatively small overall effects on the composition of immigration, with ageing populations 
tending to suppress the European share and youthful populations boosting slightly the shares  
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from Latin America. Because the effects of economic and demographic fundamentals often 
cut in opposite directions, their combined effects shown in line (6) are often modest. The 
most important joint effect of these fundamentals was to reduce the share of immigrants 
coming from Europe and to raise the share coming from East Asia.  
  Line (7) shows that giving each country the mean for the landlocked variable (0.12) 
makes very little difference to regional composition of immigration. By contrast, adjusting 
each of the countries to the mean of the English-speaking dummy (0.28) has much larger 
effects--effects that particularly favored East Asia and disadvantaged Mexico. More 
important still are the effects of distance shown in line (9). Distance effects massively 
reduced the share of immigrants from East Asia while dramatically increasing the shares 
from Latin America. They also dominate the combined effects of landlocked, English 
speaking and distance shown in line (10).  
  These results shed some light on the issue of differences by source region in the 
composition of immigration to Canada and the United States. One argument is that the 
Canadian points system has the effect of reducing the shares from regions that generate low-
skilled immigrants (Borjas, 1993). Another view stresses the proximity of the United States 
to Latin America, and especially Mexico, in accounting for the lower average skill levels of 
its immigrants (Antecol et. al., 2002). Just as an illustration, increasing the distance from the 
United States of all Latin American countries by 1,500 miles (while preserving the overall 
mean) reduces the share from these sources by 11 percentage points. This is a third of the 
difference between the US and Canadian shares. However, this will be an underestimate 
since it does not account for border effects, or for the long-run endogeneity of the immigrant 
stock. 
  The final line in Table 4 shows the effects of the immigrant stock. As we have seen, 
the ‘friends and relatives effect’, resulting from chain migration underpinned by the family 
reunification element in immigration policy, has potentially large consequences. Setting the 
stock to source country population equal across all countries increases the share of 
immigrants coming from East Asia (low stock/population ratio) by nearly 16 percentage 
points while it reduces the share from Mexico and the Caribbean combined (high 
stock/population ratio) by 23 percentage points. Clearly such effects are endogenous in the 
long run and they largely reflect the cumulative effect of the other variables driving 
immigration. Taking them into account would magnify the effects of the fundamentals on the 




The Effects of Policy Changes 
  The impact of immigration policy on immigrant numbers is assessed by means of 
counterfactual simulations. These simulations provide an important check on the model as 
well as a gauge of the effects of policy. Dynamic simulations are made for each of the 81 
countries in the dataset, again using the estimated equation in the third column of Table 3. A 
counterfactual change in one of the explanatory variables (in this case policy-related 
variables) serves to change the level of gross immigration, which in turn alters the immigrant 
stock at the end of that year. The updated immigrant stock then influences the counterfactual 
level the following year and so on. The effects of changes in policy can be assessed by 
comparing the counterfactual level of immigration with the actual level.
7 
  The first case is the period in the late 1970s when the separate quotas for the Eastern 
and Western Hemispheres were merged into a worldwide quota. This affected the total 
number of visas for both non-immediate family members and employment-based 
immigration. As noted earlier, the Western Hemisphere quota for non-immediate relatives 
was cut by 26 percent, and then in 1979 the Eastern and Western Hemispheres were merged, 
cutting the total numbers under the quota by a further 7 percent. The quota for Western 
Hemisphere employment visas was raised from zero to 24,000 in 1977, and then in 1979, it 
was merged with the Eastern hemisphere quota (of 34,000), with reductions in the total 
taking place in 1980 and 1981.  
  In the counterfactual simulation the quotas are held constant at the 1976 levels from 
1977 onwards, retaining the distinction between Eastern and Western Hemisphere countries. 
The results are displayed in the first panel of Table 5. These figures are calculated as the ratio 
of the actual immigrant numbers to the counterfactual simulation and hence they reflect the 
effect of policy change in relative terms. In the years 1977-8 the effect of the increase in 
employment visas outweighs that of the decline in family-based visas for the Western 
Hemisphere. The subsequent sharp decline in the Western Hemisphere total reflects the 
“crowding out” of Western Hemisphere immigration when the two sectors were merged. The 
overall decline in immigration between 1978 and the early 1980s reflects the cut in the 
overall quota, although, here again, the effects are much larger than the change in the quota. 
    The second change is the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. As is well 
known, the effects of IRCA were very large and this is reflected in the ratios in the second 
panel of Table 5. The IRCA effects are especially marked for Western Hemisphere countries 
                                                 
7 These simulations include the equation errors and use the same “depreciation” parameter that was 
generated for each year when calculating the immigrant stock (see Appendix 2B). Thus a simulation 
using the actual values of the explanatory variables would exactly replicate the data.  
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and only marginal for the Eastern Hemisphere. The figures can be compared with the ratio of 
IRCA legalizations to all other classes of admissions recorded in the INS immigration 
statistics. Over the years 1989 to 1991 IRCA legalizations were 126 percent of non-IRCA 
admissions, somewhat less than the figures estimated here. This suggests that the legalization 
program added a further, indirect, twist to total immigration by also increasing the number of 
non-quota immigrants.  
         The third panel of Table 5 simulates the effects of the Immigration Act of 1990, which 
took effect in 1992. The 1990 Act increased the number of visas available to non-immediate 
relatives by about a third between 1991 and 1992, a figure that was cut by 20 percent in 1995. 
In addition, the number of employment visas was more than doubled and the new category of 
diversity visas was introduced. Overall, these policy changes amounted to approximately a 75 
percent increase in the number of available visas between 1991 and 1992-4. However the net 
effect on admissions would have been much less than this because some previously non-
quota categories, such as immediate relatives and certain employment-based immigrants, 
were absorbed under the quota for the first time. Our estimated effects of these changes, 
taken together, suggest that between 1991 and 1992-4 the overall effect was to raise 
immigration by 17 percent. This is highly consistent with the trend in the INS statistics for 
non-IRCA immigrants, which rose by 18 percent over the same period. 
 
Conclusion 
         Our results offer strong support for a model of US immigration that stresses both 
individual incentives and policy constraints. Relative incomes and education, and source 
country demography all matter in a manner predicted by the theory. In addition, the non-
linear effects of inequality support the predictions of the Roy model. But other variables 
matter too--variables that are widely acknowledged to be important but that are often omitted 
in empirical work. The stock of previous immigrants from a given source country has 
substantial effect--drawing 30 more immigrants annually per thousand of the stock. In part 
this reflects the stance of immigration policy that encourages family reunion, and it provides 
a powerful cumulative effect. The effects of other policy changes are also discernible in the 
data, particularly changes in the size and structure of the immigration quota and the IRCA 
legalization program.  
         The effects of the economic and demographic fundamentals on the composition of US 
immigration by source region are mixed. While the effects of differences in source country 
per capita income shifted the composition away from developed regions towards poorer 
regions, education effects generally work in the opposite direction. It is important to  
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recognize that, both theoretically and empirically, what drives migration is income relative to 
education. Since these are strongly correlated across countries, the migration incentives are 
not as large as income gaps alone would suggest. Another key finding is the effects of 
variables like distance and English speaking, which do have decisive effects on the 
composition of US immigration. As in models of international trade, gravity effects are 
important, even in the presence of a wide range of other variables.  
           Finally the effects of changes in immigration policy can be clearly discerned in the 
data and we have made an effort to incorporate not only the overall quota level, but also key 
elements of its structure. Our evidence confirms that different components of the quota also 
interact with variables like the immigrant stock and relative education levels in ways that are 
plausible but rarely implemented in studies of immigration flows. Major policy shifts such as 
the merging of hemispheres into a worldwide quota, the IRCA legislation, and the 1990 Act 
affected both the level and the source region composition of immigration in a manner that is 
consistent with other evidence. This provides further support for our model as a realistic 
account of the factors that drive US immigration.  
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Migration and Selection 
 
  This appendix provides a fuller derivation of equation (2) in the text and it illustrates 
the effects on migration flows of changes in relative inequality between source and 
destination countries. Here we ignore the effect of age on the net present value of migration 
and examine the migration decision for individuals for a given age.  
  In the source country, y, skill endowments follow a normal distribution:  
s ∼ N (µs, σs
2). The incomes that individual i (i = 1, …, n) receives at home in country y, and 
would receive if he/she were to migrate to country x, are: 
Income in destination: wxi = αx + βxsi, distributed as wx ~  N (µx, σx
2).  
(A1) 
Income in origin: wyi = αy + βysi; distributed as wy ~ N (µy, σy
2).  
 
Thus incomes, and income inequality, differ in origin and destination but incomes in x are 
perfectly correlated with those in y across individuals in the origin country. This simplifying 
assumption could be relaxed without qualitatively altering the results, provided that cov (wx, 
wy) is sufficiently positive (see Borjas, 1987, p. 533). 
  As discussed in the text the cost elements are the following. Individual-specific 
migration costs, zi, follow a normal distribution, z ∼ N(µz, σz
2), with mean, µz, and variance 
σz
2, where z is independent of s (Cov (s,z) = 0). The constant cost elements, c1 − c2(q), are the 
same for all potential immigrants. The cost associated with the skill-selective element of 
immigration policy is γ(δ − si), where δ is a threshold or benchmark skill level. 
  As shown in the text, the probability that an individual, i, will migrate from country y 
to x, mi, is: 
  
mi = Prob (vi > 0), where vi = wxi − wyi − zi − c1 + c2(q) − γ(δ  − si)                (A2) 
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where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. 
  The standard deviation of v, can be written as: 
 






x v γσ σ 2 γσ σ 2 σ σ 2 γ σ σ σ σ − + − + + + =              (A4) 
 
The effects of changes in income distribution and in the selectivity of immigration policy 
depend on the sign of the numerator in the bracketed term in (3) as well as on the sign of the  
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derivative of σv with respect to σx, σy, and γ. The following table gives the conditions for 








Effects of Income Distribution and Immigration Policy on Migration 
 
Effect on migration rate  
of:  
Destination is "relatively 
rich":  
µx > µy + µz + c1 − c2(q) 
 + γ(δ − µs) 
Destination is "relatively 
poor":  
µx < µy + µz + c1 − c2(q) 
 + γ(δ − µs) 
Income distribution in 
destination country 
      dM/dσx > 0 
      if: σx < σy − γσs 
      dM/dσx > 0 
      if: σx > σy − γσs 
Income distribution in source 
country  
      dM/dσy > 0 
      if: σy < σx + γσs 
      dM/dσy > 0 
      if: σy > σx + γσs 
Selective immigration policy        dM/dγ > 0 
      if: γ > (σy − σx)σs  
                + (δ − µs)(σv/v) 
      dM/dγ > 0 
      if: γ > (σy − σx)/σs 
                + (δ − µs)(σv/v) 
 
  We examine the case where destination country income exceeds source country 
income adjusted for migration costs (µx > µy + µz + c1 − c2(q) + γ(δ − µs), and assume γ is 
small. For a source country that is initially relatively equal (σy < σx − γσs) rising inequality 









+ =1 , beyond which immigration 
will decline. The effect of changing inequality in the destination is the exact opposite. Thus 
the immigration rate is an inverse U shaped function of the ratio of source to destination 
inequality. Note also that, in the presence of skill-selective immigration policy (γ > 0), the 
peak immigration rate will occur at a point where the inequality ratio exceeds 1.  
















The figure shows wage earning profile, w(x), for the destination and three alternative 
profiles, w(y), for the source country. The source country profiles are net of migration costs 
and they intersect at a mean income level that is lower than the mean of w(x).   When source 
and destination profiles are parallel, as in w(x) and w(y)1, then all individuals in the source 
country (with sufficiently low z) have an incentive to migrate. If the source country has a 
more equal income distribution, as in w(y)2, then low-skill individuals for whom w(y)2  > 
w(x) will not migrate and total migration will be lower than previously.   In the case where 
the source country is more unequal than the destination, as in profile w(y)3, migration will 
also be lower than in the case of parallel profiles, and migrants will be negatively selected.  
  These relationships will be shifted by skill-selective immigration policy. This is 
equivalent to steepening the slope of w(y) in Figure A1.1, at the same time as shifting the 
profile down at the median skill level. Increasingly selective policy always increases the 
positive selection of immigrants, and could increase migration, an effect that is more likely 









+ >1 . In this case the shift effect 
dominates the slope effect.  
 
APPENDIX 2 
Data Used in Estimation: Sources and Methods 
 
A: The INS Gross Immigration Data 
 
The data for the number of immigrants to the United States by country is taken from 
the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Statistical Yearbooks. The data covers 
all legal immigration, including refugees, and it includes both those who applied from abroad 
and those who are already in the US and are adjusting to permanent status. The country of 
origin classification used here is by country of birth rather than by country of last residence. 
Choosing country of birth rather than country of last residence allows us to gain consistency 
between the immigrant flow and the stock of resident immigrants, which is only available by 
place of birth. 
Before 1976, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) defined a fiscal year 
as July 1 through June 30. For example, FY1974 began on July 1, 1973, and ended on June 
30, 1974. In 1976, however, the INS changed its definition of a fiscal year to October 1 
through September 30. Under the new definition of a fiscal year, FY1981 began on October 
1, 1980, and ended on September 30, 1981. Because this change occurred during the time 
series with which we are working, the original data collected from the INS Annual Reports 
and Statistical Yearbooks have now been adjusted. The pre-1976 annual observations now 
conform to the 1976 definition of a fiscal year, one which begins in October 1 and ends in 
September 30. 
The INS does not report monthly totals of immigrants admitted by country of birth, 
so some assumptions were invoked to make the adjustment. To do so, we used data that the 
INS labeled as “Immigrants Admitted by Region and Country of Birth” for the Third Quarter 
(July 1 – September 30) of 1976. To convert the 1976 “June” fiscal year into a “September” 
fiscal year, we added the 1976 Third Quarter totals to the “June” FY1976 totals for each 
country. These sums represent the total immigration from each country to the United States 
during the 15-month period from July 1, 1975 to September 30, 1976. To estimate the 
immigration for the twelve months of the new “September” FY1976, we multiplied the 15-
month totals by 0.8. This operation gives four-fifths of the 15-month totals, results that 
should be roughly equivalent to the amount of immigration that occurred during four of the 
five quarters represented from July 1, 1975 to September 30, 1976.   
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This process was then repeated for the previous year. Thus, to convert the “June” 
FY1975 into a “September” fiscal year, we added one fifth of the 15-month totals that we 
used to adjust FY1976 to the “June” FY1975 figures. We then took four-fifths of these sums 
as the data for the new “September” FY1975. This process was carried back to FY1960, the 
first year in the data set. Thus, all of the annual gross immigration figures reported in this 
adjusted INS database now represent October to September totals. 
 
B: Annual US Foreign-Born Stock Values 
 
Benchmark Estimates 
Foreign-born population stock data for census years 1970, 1980 and 1990 are taken 
from the Census Bureau, Population Division, Technical Working Paper No. 29, Historical 
Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850-1990 (1999). 
This paper by Campbell J. Gibson and Emily Lennon is available online at:  
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/twps0029.html.  
            Since the 2000 census figures were not yet available at the time of writing, the only 
source of post-1990 foreign-born stock values is the Census Bureau’s annual Current 
Population Survey (CPS) March demographic supplement. These data were obtained from 
the online data extraction service at: http://ferret.bls.census.gov/cgi-bin/ferret. A description 
of the survey’s methodology is available online at: http://www.bls.census.gov/cgi-
bin/dms?Folder=657. The CPS uses a system of supplemental weights to estimate nationwide 
foreign-born stock values from the information it collects from its sample. Although the CPS 
data are useful for displaying demographic trends, the small sample size makes the estimates 
highly variable. Furthermore, CPS data is only available after 1994 (and up to 1998). To fill 
out our data set, we used the 1990 census values and the 1994-1998 CPS data to estimate a 
simple source-country-specific regression against time. The regression was then used to 
generate predicted foreign-born by source country for 1998. 
 
Interpolating Between-Census Years 
  In order to obtain annual estimates of the foreign-born stock by country, we 
interpolate between the benchmarks established obtained from the census or calculated from 
the CPS, using the following stock adjustment equation: 
  S t+1 = Mt + dSt  
where St is the stock at the beginning of year t and Mt is the flow during that year. We use the 
gross flow series by birthplace (as defined above) in order to update the stock. The stock 
observed midway though a year is updated with the flow beginning in that year but carrying 
through to the next year.  
  As noted in the text, the parameter d reflects deaths, return migration and illegal 
immigration, which subtract or add to the stock independently of the additions through gross 
immigration and hence 1 – d is the rate at which the stock ‘depreciates’. This depreciation 
rate is calculated for each interval between census or CPS benchmarks using an iterative 
procedure beginning with St, such that the value of St+10 obtained by cumulating forward is 
reconciled with that of the next census benchmark. Thus there is a different value of d for 
each country for each interval between benchmarks. However, in some cases no census 
estimate was available for 1970; in that case the value of d calculated for the 1980-1990 
interval was used, together with the gross migration series, to extrapolate back to 1970. 
Similarly where it was not possible to construct a benchmark figure for 1998 using the CPS 






C: Economic and Demographic Variables 
 
The relative income variable is real GDP per capita at 1985 international prices from the 
Penn World Tables version 5.6 updated by the World Bank, available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata. Average years of education for the 
population age 15 and over are from the database of Barro and Lee, available at: 
http://www2.cid.harvard.edu. Since the frequency is five years, the data for each country 
were linearly interpolated. The share of population aged 15-19 are taken from the annual data 
(available on CD) underlying the United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2000 
Revision (Geneva: UN Population Division). Household income inequality is based on the 
data originally assembled by Deininger and Squire at the World Bank, now augmented and 
available from the WIDER Institute at: http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm. The 
observations selected are (almost) exclusively those labeled as “high quality” with linear 
interpolations between these observations. Certain adjustments were made according to 
whether the observations were for income/expenditure, gross/net income or 
individuals/households.  
 
D: Immigration Policy Variables 
 
Immigration policy is characterized in equation (4) in the text by a series of variables denoted 
by X. The X's are variables reflecting the quota limits that are interacted, where appropriate, 
with different variables representing country characteristics. The derivation of the X's for 
each category is detailed below: 
 
Non-immediate relatives: (Xr) 
Non-immediate relatives enter under the following preference categories in the post 
1990 legislation (with total numbers in parentheses): (1) adult married children of US 
citizens (23,400); (2) spouses and unmarried children of US residents, 75 percent of whom 
must be minors (114,200); (3) married children of US citizens (23,400); and (4) siblings of 
adult US citizens (65,000). Before 1992 the preference categories were broadly similar (with 
percentages of total quota in parentheses): (1) unmarried children of US citizens (20%); (2) 
spouses and unmarried children of resident aliens (20%); (3) married children of US citizens 
(10%); and (4) siblings of US citizens (24%).  
The total number of visas available for these categories is calculated as follows: 
Eastern Hemisphere  1966-78: 170,000  World    1979-81: 214,600 
Western Hemisphere  1966-76: 120,000     "    1981-91: 210,000 
       "           "    1977-78:   88,800     "    1992-94: 281,000 
   "    1995-98: 226,000 
Note that until 1976 there were no preference categories for the Western Hemisphere and so 
the entire quota is included under this heading. For 1977-8, when a preference system was in 
force, the number is the total quota net of employment and refugee categories. From 1992 the 
figure is calculated as the total quota net of employment, diversity, and immediate family 
categories plus the floor of 226,000 for non-immediate relatives. 
The variable Xr is the total number of visas divided by world population and that value is 
applied to each country. Before 1978 it is calculated to produce a separate value for each 
hemisphere by using respective hemispheric populations.  
 
Employment visas:  (Xe) 
From 1992 the employment-related visas are given under the following categories 
(with total numbers in parentheses): (1) individuals of outstanding ability (40,000); (2) 
professionals with advanced degrees or with exceptional abilities (40, 000); (3) skilled 
workers or unskilled shortage workers (40,000); and (5) special occupations including  
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religious workers (10,000); (6) investors (10,000). Before 1992 there were just two 
employment categories (with percentage of quota in parentheses): (1) exceptional 
professional, scientists and artists (10%); (2) skilled and unskilled workers in shortage 
occupations (10%).  
The total number of visas for these categories is calculated as follows: 
Eastern Hemisphere  1966-78:   34,000  World    1979:        58,000 
Western Hemisphere  1966-76:            0      "    1980:        56,000   
Western Hemisphere  1977-78:   24,000      "    1981-91:   54,000 
    "      1992-98: 140,000 
The variable Xe is the total number of visas divided by the world population. Before 
1979, it is calculated to produce a separate value for each hemisphere by using respective 
hemispheric populations.  
 
Diversity Immigrants: (Xd) 
The diversity category was introduced for the first time in the 1990 Immigration Act. 
Diversity visas are a special category introduced to apply to countries that were under-
represented in US immigration following the 1965 Amendments. Countries eligible for 
diversity visas are those with less than 50,000 immigrants in the preceding five years. In the 
period 1992-4, 40,000 (AA-1) visas were available and these were awarded among the 
applicants by lottery. For those years the list of eligible countries comprised mainly Europe 
(excluding the former Soviet Union), Canada and a few other countries. Within this list there 
was a quota specific to Ireland with the rest distributed among the other eligible countries. 
From 1995 55,000 (DV) visas were available and the list of eligible countries includes most 
of the world, with a few specific exceptions. For these years the total allocation was divided 
into quotas by continent, with no specific country quotas and a per-country ceiling of 7 
percent of the worldwide total.  
The variable Xd is defined only for 1992-8 and only for those countries eligible to 
participate; otherwise it takes the value of zero. For 1992-4 it is defined for each participating 
country as the total number of non-Irish visas available divided by the total population of 
countries eligible to participate, excluding Ireland. The variable for Ireland is the Irish quota 
divided by Irish population. For 1995-8 it is calculated by continent and applied to each 
eligible country within that continent.  
 
Refugees and Asylees: (Xa) 
Refugees and asylees were integrated in the total quota until the 1980 Refugee Act. 
Since then the number, which is not part of the overall ceiling, is determined annually. The 
‘quotas’ for refugees are as follows: 
Eastern Hemisphere  1966-78: 10,200 
Western Hemisphere  1966-76:          0 
      "            "             1977-78:   7,200 
World  1979:   50,000    1986:   67,000    1993: 116,000 
1980: 213,700    1987:   70,000    1994: 117,500   
1981: 217,000    1988:   87,500    1995: 111,000     
1982: 140,000    1989: 116,500    1996:   90,000     
1983:   90,000     1990: 110,000    1997:   78,000     
1984:   72,000     1991: 116,000    1998:   83,000 
1985:   70,000    1992: 123,500     
The variable Xa is defined as the refugee "quota" divided by the country population. Before 
1979 it is calculated to produce a separate value for each hemisphere by using respective 
hemispheric populations. From 1980 the overall allocation was divided into regional totals. A 
separate value was therefore calculated for each region, and applied to all countries in that 
region.   
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Immigration Reform and Control Act: (Xirc) 
As regards permanent admissions, IRCA made two major provisions. The first was 
legalization of illegal immigrants who had resided in the US continuously since before 1982. 
After first applying for temporary status (during a window in 1987-8) these immigrants could 
gain permanent status after 18 months. The second granted temporary visas to seasonal 
agricultural workers (SAWs), previously working illegally, with the right to become 
permanent immigrants after one year. Further temporary visas were made available for new 
agricultural workers, with the right to become permanent after two years. The IRCA 
provisions are relevant here only insofar as they offered a new channel for permanent 
immigration. Most of the illegal immigrants eligible for adjustment under IRCA were from 
Mexico and Central America (especially the former), and the bulk of these adjustments took 
place in 1989-91.  
Our variable Xirc is derived from the number of illegal immigrants living in the 
United States in 1980 estimated by Warren and Passell (1987), pp. 380-1. Estimates for 1980 
are appropriate given that legalizations applied to those living in the US since before 
1982.The estimates are based on a comparison of census data for 1980 and measures of the 
stock of legal immigrants based on INS data. The total number of just over two million is 
considered as a lower bound. Figures are given for specific countries and for continental 
remainders; the latter were distributed across countries using 1980 population weights. The 
variable Xirc was obtained by dividing the number of illegals thus calculated by the origin 
country population in 1990. It is applied only to the years 1989-91. 
 
Backlog: (Xb) 
In 1995 the burden of dealing with adjustments shifted from consular offices to the 
INS, as a result of abolishing the requirement that eligible immigrants present in the US had 
to leave the country and apply for immigrant visas through consular offices abroad. As a 
result, between the end of fiscal 1994 and fiscal 1998 the backlog of applications pending a 
decision increased from 121,000 to 811,000. The INS estimates that, in the absence of the 
increase in the pending caseload, legal immigration would have been 110,000 to 140,000 
higher for each of the years 1995 to 1998 (INS, 2000, p. 15).  
Our variable Xb is simply a dummy for the years 1995-8.  
 
E: The Balanced Panel 
 
  In our econometric work and in the simulations, we use a balanced panel of 81 
countries across 28 years. Although there are about twice this number of source countries 
separately identified in the INS immigration series, the remainder were dropped from the 
sample because one or more of the explanatory variables was not available for some or all of 
the period. In cases where countries have split or amalgamated during the period, they have 
been re-aggregated to the combined total throughout. Thus for immigration and the foreign-
born stocks, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union have been re-assembled. East 
and West Germany are together throughout as are China and Taiwan. In these cases the 
economic and demographic variables used to explain immigration are aggregated using 
current population weights.  
  Panel A of Table A1 lists all the countries in the dataset by region. As panel B 
shows, these account for 82.5 percent of all immigration over the period. But, as reflected in 
panel C, under-representation is greater for some regions than others. This is especially 
important for Africa, the Caribbean and the Middle East. Important countries that are omitted 
include: Vietnam, Iraq and Lebanon in Asia and the Middle East; Ethiopia, Somalia and 




A: Countries in the Balanced Panel 
Western Europe  Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom. (16) 
Eastern Europe  Czechoslovakia (frmr), Hungary, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union (frmr), 
Yugoslavia( frmr). (6) 
Asia  Bangladesh, China (inc Taiwan), Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Korea (South), Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan Philippines, Singapore, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand. (14) 
Middle East  Cyprus, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Turkey (5) 
North America  Canada, Mexico. (2) 
Caribbean  Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago. (4) 
Central America  Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama. (6) 
South America  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. (11) 
Africa  Algeria, Cameroon, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South 
Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. (14) 
Oceania  Australia, Fiji, New Zealand. (3) 
 
 
B: Numbers in Balanced Panel and in Total Immigration 1971-98, by period 
Period Immigrants  in 
Sample 
Total Immigration   Percent in Dataset 
1971-80 3,656,107  4,389,630  83.3 
1981-90 5,913,094  7,337,806  80.6 
1991-98 6,374,841  7,597,762  83.9 
1971-98 15,944,042  19,325,630  82.5 
 
C: Numbers in the Balanced Panel and Total Immigration by Region 1990-8 
Region   Immigrants in 
Dataset 
Total Immigration   Percent in Dataset 
Europe 2,507,796  2,575,018  97.4 
Asia 4,959,606  6,839,410  72.5 
Africa and Oceania  379,085  700,070  54.1 
North America  6,923,475  8,034,314  86.2 






Source Area Composition of US Immigration, 1951-2000 
(percent of total from each source) 
     
Region of origin 
   
1951-60 
   
1961-70 
   
1971-80 
   
1981-90 
   
1991-2000     
Europe 
   
52.7 
   
33.8 
   
17.8 
   
10.4 
   
14.9     
      Western 
   
49.8 
   
30.8 
   
14.7 
   
7.5 
   
5.9     
      Eastern 
   
2.9 
   
3.0 
   
3.1 
   
2.9 
   
9.0     
Asia 
   
6.1 
   
12.9 
   
35.3 
   
37.3 
   
30.7     
Americas 
   
39.6 
   
51.7 
   
44.1 
   
49.3 
   
49.3     
      Canada  
   
15.0 
   
12.4 
   
3.8 
   
2.1 
   
2.1     
      Mexico 
   
11.9 
   
13.7 
   
14.2 
   
22.6 
   
24.7     
      Caribbean 
   
4.9 
   
14.2 
   
16.5 
   
11.9 
   
10.8     
      Central America 
   
1.8 
   
3.1 
   
3.0 
   
6.4 
   
5.8     
      South America 
   
3.6 
   
7.8 
   
6.6 
   
6.3 
   
5.9     
Africa 
   
0.6 
   
0.9 
   
1.8 
   
2.4 
   
3.9     
Oceania 
   
0.5 
   
0.8 
   
0.9 
   
0.6 
   
0.6     
Total (000's) 
   
2,515 
   
3,322 
   
4,493 
   
7,338 
   
9,095 
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for 2000, Table 2. 
Notes: Immigrants classified by country of last residence. Percentages exclude the category "origin not 
specified". Western Europe is defined as the countries of the European Union, excluding Finland but 






Class of Admission by Source Area, 1998 
(percent of total for each source) 
     
Class of 
Admission 
















   
Diversity 
program 
   
All immigrants 
   
29.0 
   
11.7 
   
42.9 
   
8.3 
   
6.9     
Europe 
   
9.6 
   
15.0 
   
32.0 
   
20.8 
   
20.9     
    West 
   
12.1 
   
27.5 
   
46.4 
   
2.3 
   
11.2     
    East 
   
8.4 
   
8.5 
   
25.3 
   
30.3 
   
25.8     
Asia 
   
35.5 
   
16.9 
   
37.9 
   
5.3 
   
3.9     
Americas 
   
34.2 
   
7.3 
   
51.9 
   
5.1 
   
0.9     
    Canada 
   
14.3 
   
43.8 
   
35.4 
   
0.1 
   
4.8     
    Mexico 
   
42.1 
   
2.8 
   
45.6 
   
0.0 
   
0.0     
    Caribbean 
   
33.8 
   
3.1 
   
42.9 
   
18.8 
   
1.3     
    Cnt. America  
   
26.7 
   
11.1 
   
58.7 
   
2.4 
   
0.5     
    Sth. America  
   
24.5 
   
12.6 
   
58.9 
   
1.6 
   
2.1     
Africa 
   
8.2 
   
7.2 
   
35.8 
   
10.8 
   
37.7     
Oceania 
   
30.0 
   
14.1 
   
42.5 
   
0.6 
   
12.4     
Total (000's) 
   
191.5 
   
77.5 
   
283.4 
   
54.6 
   
45.5 
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for 1998, Table 9.  
Notes: Immigrants classified by country of last residence. Rows do not add to 100 because they exclude 
certain other classes of admission. Western Europe is defined as the countries of the European Union, 






Gross Immigration Rate Regressions 
(81 countries, 28 years; dependent variable: log immigrants admitted/source country 
population) 
 




















































































Quota Xr × immigrant stock 
 
   44.42   
(3.4) 
Quota Xe × schooling years ratio 
 




   0.15   
(1.6)  
Refugee quota × civil war 
 
   1.14   
(1.8) 
IRCA legalization  
 




   −0.06  
(0.09) 
Adj R
2  0.73   0.76   0.77  
Hetero (χ
2
(1))  6.11   1.31   2.46  


















  Baseline shares: percent of total immigration 1971-1998 
  7.3 6.0 3.9  31.5 3.0 0.6 1.8  21.7  12.8 5.2 6.2 
Variable adjusted  Deviation from baseline due to changing a variable to the all-country mean for each year 
(1) Per capita income  5.2  −0.9  −0.1  −4.3  −0.8  0.5 3.1 1.4  −1.7  −1.3  −1.0 
(2) Education years  −2.4  −3.2  1.1  −0.9  2.1  −0.4  −1.3  −1.6  3.4 2.7 0.4 
(3) Income+education  1.3  −3.4  1.2  −4.9  1.0  −0.2  −0.2  1.9 2.0 1.3  −0.1 
(4) Inequality  1.2  1.5  −0.1  1.5 0.1 0.0 0.3  −2.5  −0.9  −0.6  −0.5 
(5) Share aged 15-29  1.5  1.1  0.1  −0.8  0.0 0.0 0.2  −1.4  −0.4  −0.1  −0.2 
(6) Inc+edu+ineq+age  4.6  −2.1  1.1  −3.3  1.2  −0.1  0.3  −1.7  0.5 0.5  −0.8 
(7) Landlocked  0.0  0.1  0.0  −0.1  0.1 0.0 0.0  −0.1  0.0 0.0 0.1 
(8) English-speaking  −0.3  1.4 0.9  −4.9  −0.6  −0.3  −1.0  4.9  −1.9  1.2 0.6 
(9) Distance  −1.9  0.1 1.2  27.0 1.8 0.9  −1.3  −14.2  −8.0  −3.3  −2.3 
(10) Land+eng+dist  −1.3  2.4 3.1  20.0 0.9 0.2  −1.5  −11.5  −8.3  −2.6  −1.4 






The Effects of Immigration Policy 
(actual/no-policy-change counterfactual) 
 
 Merging  Hemispheres 
  1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Eastern  Hemisphere  100.0  99.8  99.7 103.7 103.1 102.6 
Western  Hemisphere  100.0 141.2 137.2  73.6  64.1  53.5 
World  100.0 116.0 113.2  88.5  83.5  74.4 
  Immigration Control and Reform Act 
  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Eastern  Hemisphere  100.0 101.6 101.7 101.4 100.1 100.1 
Western  Hemisphere  100.0 170.1 180.7 205.2 120.1 115.5 
World  100.0 134.7 144.7 157.8 108.3 105.7 
  1990 Immigration Act 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Eastern  Hemisphere  100.0 117.3 117.1 117.3 116.1 115.5 
Western  Hemisphere  100.0 117.7 117.4 117.6 113.6 113.6 
World  100.0 117.5 117.2 117.4 115.1 114.7 
 